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In this work we address a game theoretic variant of the Subset Sum problem, in which two decision mak-
ers (agents/players) compete for the usage of a common resource represented by a knapsack capacity.
Each agent owns a set of integer weighted items and wants to maximize the total weight of its own items
included in the knapsack. The solution is built as follows: Each agent, in turn, selects one of its items (not
previously selected) and includes it in the knapsack if there is enough capacity. The process ends when
the remaining capacity is too small for including any item left.
We look at the problem from a single agent point of view and show that ﬁnding an optimal sequence of
items to select is an NP-hard problem. Therefore we propose two natural heuristic strategies and analyze
their worst-case performance when (1) the opponent is able to play optimally and (2) the opponent
adopts a greedy strategy.
From a centralized perspective we observe that some known results on the approximation of the clas-
sical Subset Sum can be effectively adapted to the multi-agent version of the problem.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
In the computer science literature of the last two decades sev-
eral classical combinatorial optimization problems have been
revisited in a game theoretic setting where multiple deciders take
over the role of a single decision maker. This new ﬁeld of research
is receiving growing attention and led to the emergence of
algorithmic game theory (Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, & Vazirani,
2007).
In this context we address the problem of two agents competing
for a shared resource. It can be described as a game theoretic var-
iant of the classical Subset Sum problem, in which there are two
players, or agents, called Pa and Pb, and a given amount c of a
shared resource. Each agent owns a set of items with non-negative
weights and knows the other agent’s item set, i.e. there is perfect
information.
The Subset Sum game works as follows: Starting with Pa, the
agents take turns to select exactly one of their items which was
not selected before. The total weight of all selected items must
not exceed the capacity c at any time. The aim of the game is, foreach agent, to select a subset of its items with maximum total
weight. This problem is new and has not been studied in the liter-
ature before. In the following we point out some possible applica-
tion scenarios.1.1. Motivation
The Subset Sum game is an interesting theoretical problem in
its own right as a game theoretic version of the most basic combi-
natorial optimization problem. Moreover, one can ﬁnd applications
in all scenarios where a limited resource has to be allocated to dif-
ferent and possibly selﬁsh users.
In the general setting of a single-machine scheduling problem
two agents may compete for the processing time and want to max-
imize their utilization of the machine within a given planning hori-
zon by scheduling some of their jobs. To decide in a fair way which
jobs to accept for processing, a round-robin mechanism is often the
method of choice (see for instance Agnetis, Pacciarelli, & Paciﬁci,
2007; Auletta, De Prisco, Penna, & Persiano, 2009). It remains for
the agents to decide which jobs to submit.
In many communication networks there is the need to allocate
bandwidth based on user requests (using, for example, the RSVP-
TE protocol Awduche et al., 2001). Consider a single time unit in
which two agents (users) have a number of different bandwidth
requirements, corresponding to different applications, to be allo-
cated. In a simpliﬁed scenario the users are asked to submit their
requests with a round-robin discipline and want to maximize their
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lated context can be found in the next section.
In a business setting a highly specialized producer, say a much
sought-after dress maker, may produce creations for two design-
ers. From a long term business perspective, the producer wants
to retain both designers as customers, however, the production
capacity up to the given deadline (the fashion show) is limited.
Thus, the producer accepts orders alternating between the two
designers as long as the production capacity sufﬁces to fulﬁll the
current set of orders. It remains to decide for the designers which
creations to submit to this allocation mechanism and which to pro-
duce elsewhere with a less desirable producer.
1.2. Related works
Several problems strictly related to the Subset Sum game have
been considered in the literature. In particular, due to its simple
structure, the {0,1}-Knapsack problem was frequently considered
in a game-theoretic context and will be brieﬂy discussed in
Section 5. Recently, (Marini, Nicosia, Paciﬁci, & Pferschy, 2013;
Nicosia, Paciﬁci, & Pferschy, 2011) considered a knapsack-type
scenario with unitary weights in which the decision process is per-
formed in rounds and managed by a central decision mechanism
(arbitrator). In every round each of the two agents selects exactly
one of its items and submits the item for possible inclusion in
the knapsack, then the arbitrator chooses one of the items as
‘‘winner’’ of the round. The winning item is permanently included
in the knapsack. The process goes on as long as there is enough
capacity. A related problem where jobs are submitted in rounds
for selection to be processed on a single machine was recently
considered in Agnetis, Nicosia, Paciﬁci, and Pferschy (in press).
In the so called Knapsack Sharing problem studied by several
authors (see for instance Fujimoto & Yamada, 2006; Hiﬁ, M’Hallab,
& Sadﬁ, 2005), a single objective function balancing the proﬁts
among the agents is considered in a centralized perspective.
Another interesting game, based on the maximum {0,1}-Knapsack,
interpreted as a special on-line problem, is addressed in Liberatore
(2000) where a two person zero-sum game, called Knapsack Game,
is considered. Knapsack problems are also addressed in the context
of auctions, see for example (Aggarwal & Hartline, 2006; Brotcorne,
Hanaﬁ, & Mansi, 2009).
Kindred problems are the so-called Bin Packing Games. There, one
considers k agents representing bins and another n agents represent-
ing items of given size. The value function of a coalition of bins and
items is the maximum total size of items in the coalition that can be
packed into the bins of the coalition. This class of problemswas intro-
duced in Faigle and Kern (1993, 1998) where numerous results are
provided. The Selﬁsh Bin Packing is another interesting game theoretic
variant, where each item is controlled by a selﬁsh agent who pays a
cost proportional to the ratio between its own item size and the total
weight of the items packed in the same bin. In Epstein and Kleiman
(2011), the authors study different equilibria and the associated
quality measures, namely Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability.1
A signiﬁcant application closely related to our problem is the so
calledAdmission Controlproblem(ACP)which, in awide sense, refers
to the design of mechanisms for managing trafﬁc requests in com-
munication systems (for a comprehensive survey, see for instance
(Ahmed, 2005; Ghaderi & Boutaba, 2006)). In bandwidth-managed
networks, it is required to evaluate (i) if bandwidth is available to
service a new potential user and (ii) the QoS (quality of service) that
can be provided to this user. Only if bandwidth is available, the new
user is admitted. Clearly, new users can be viewed as selﬁsh users1 Surprisingly, the investigation of this problem from a game-theoretic perspective
allowed to establish new results on the approximation ratio of a heuristic algorithm
for the classical bin packing problem (Epstein, Kleiman, & Mestre, 2009).competing for network bandwidth, i.e., resource capacity. In this
context, game theory techniques have been used to designmanage-
ment protocols tomonitor, control, and enforce the use of shared re-
sources and services in networks. For instance, in Yolken and
Bambos (2008) the authors propose pricing schemes inﬂuencing
users in their decision to take part or not in a wireless channel. The
equilibria inducedby these schemes and their performance are eval-
uated showing their potential to produce high quality outcomes in
an incentive-compatibleway.Analogously, the issueof designing re-
source allocation mechanisms that produce efﬁcient throughput
and congestion allocations despite the selﬁsh users’ behavior is dis-
cussed in Shenker (1995).
1.3. Our contributions
The above mentioned works follow two established approaches
in classical and algorithmic game theory and focus on (i) ﬁnding
equilibria, i.e., solutions where each agent obtains no beneﬁt by
moving away from the current solution, and/or (ii) designing
mechanisms, i.e. protocols leading the (selﬁsh) agents to solutions
which are either globally optimal or follow some intuitive, easy to
compute rule. The problem we address in this paper is indeed a
multi-deciders version of the well known Subset Sum problem
where two agents compete for the capacity of a common knapsack
in presence of a very simple mechanism (round robin). However,
we adopt a different perspective here, namely we look at the prob-
lem from the point of view of one agent and seek strategies opti-
mizing her payoff depending on the behavior of the other agent.
In this paper we show that it is NP-hard to compute an optimal
strategy for one agent by a simple reduction from the standard
Subset Sum problem. Hence, we introduce heuristic approaches
and analyze two very natural strategies based on a greedy concept
which would be intuitive rules of thumb for any practical game
scenario (Section 2.2).
The ﬁrst strategy is the pure greedy algorithm, whichmaximizes
in each round theweight of the selected item. The second strategy is
an extension which tries to take the subsequent round into account
in the decision. Assuming that one agent adopts the proposed strat-
egy, we analyze the performances when (i) the opponent is able to
playoptimally and (ii) theopponentalso follows thegreedy strategy.
In particular, we are able to show that the ﬁrst heuristic has a perfor-
mance ratio of 1/2 both against an optimal opponent and against a
greedyopponent (Section3.1),while the secondproposed algorithm
has a performance ratio of 2/3 against the optimal opponent (see
Section 3.2). Moreover, we show that a natural generalization of
these greedy based strategies invoking a farther reaching consider-
ation of future rounds does not allow a further improvement of the
2/3 performance ratio (Section 3.3).
Furthermore, we observe that from a centralized perspective,
some known results on the approximation of the classical Subset
Sum can be effectively adapted to the multi-agent version of the
problem (Section 4).
After showing in Section 5 that two natural extensions of the
proposed algorithms to a Knapsack Game problem do not provide
a bounded performance ratio, we conclude with a few directions
for future research (Section 6).
1.4. Formal problem setting
Let Pa and Pb indicate the two agents. Agent Px owns a set Nx of
nx items, where item i of agent Px has a non-negative weight xi,
with x = a, b. We assume that Na \ Nb = ; and that there is perfect
information, so agents know each other’s item sets.
The game can be seen as a sequence of rounds, where in each
round Pa selects an item from Na followed by the selection of an
item from Nb by agent Pb. The total weight of all selected items
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game one agent is unable to select any more items because the
remaining capacity is too small, the agent just remains idle and
the other agent can continue to select items.
It is easy to show that the associated decision problem, namely
whether both agents can reach a certain total weight, is NP-
complete.
Subset Sum Game Decision (SSGD): Given aj and bj, j = 1, . . . ,n,
and two positive values Qa and Qb. Is there an outcome of the
Subset Sum game such that Pa gains a total weightP Qa and
Pb gainsP Qb?Proposition 1. Problem SSGD is NP-complete.Proof. Reduction from the Subset Sum problem (SSP): Given n
integer numbers w1, . . . ,wn and a value W, is there a subset S of
items with total weight equal to W?
To answer the decision version of SSP consider the following
instance I of SSGD:Agent Pa tries to solve SSP, i.e. ai =wi for i = 1, . . . ,n.
Agent Pb is negligible with bi = e for all i and c =W + ne, where e < 1/n.
SetQa =WandQb = e. It is easy to see that thestrategiespursuedby the
two agents do not matter at all since Pb always can select all its items
while Pa never can exploit the capacity c W < 1. Pa can reach Qa =W
iff SSP is a YES-instance. h2. Strategies for one agent
For notational convenience, we address the problem from the
point of view of agent Pa. For agent Pb, the perspective is com-
pletely the same after subtracting from c the weight of the item
selected by Pa in the ﬁrst round.
In this paper, with a slight abuse of terminology, a strategy2 S of
an agent indicates a rule, or an algorithm, that speciﬁes which item
to select in any round depending on the capacity and the sets of se-
lected and still available items of both agents. Since the outcome of
the game depends on the strategies employed by the two agents, if
Pa follows a strategy S and Pb a strategy Z, then we denote the total
weights obtained by agent Pa and Pb as ASZ and BSZ, respectively.
Clearly, for every pair of feasible strategies S and Z, ASZ + BSZ 6 c.
2.1. Optimal strategy
In general, the optimal strategy of an agent depends not only on
the outcome of previous rounds but also on the future decisions of
the other agent. If the strategy of Pb is not known, there is no way
for Pa to always make optimal decisions. Else, if agent Pa knows the
strategy Z of agent Pb, it can compute an optimal strategy O, maxi-
mizing the total weight of the selected items. This can be done by
modeling the Subset Sum game as a game in extensive form and
representing it by a game tree as it is usually done in game theory
(see e.g. Osborne, 2004, Section 5).
A game tree represents all possible decisions of both agents in
sequential form. Each node of the tree corresponds to the decision
of anagent ina certain round, such that everypossibleoutcomeof this
decision is represented bya child node. Thus, the root of the tree (i.e. a
node in level 1) corresponds to the decision of Pa in the ﬁrst round and
hasna childnodes, one for eachpossible itemselectedbyPa. Each such
child node (i.e. a node in level 2) represents the decision of Pb in the
ﬁrst round. Clearly, feasible selections are those where the total
weight reached at the current node does not exceed the capacity c.2 In game theory, a strategy would denote the set of all decisions for any possible
scenario of the game. This would be the result of a strategy in our more algorithmic
terminology.Considering an arbitrary node in level ‘, ‘P 2, in the tree, one
could easily determine all previous decisions by moving upwards
along the unique path to the root of the tree. Thus, the remaining
capacity and the set of not yet selected items of the current agent
(Pa if ‘  1 mod 2, Pb otherwise) are known and one can establish
which items could still be selected at this node. Each of them
gives rise to a child node in level ‘ + 1. It is convenient to assume
that an agent selects an artiﬁcial item of weight 0 if it cannot se-
lect any other item, but the other agent still has items to select.
Every leaf of this game tree describes a feasible outcome of the
game and yields a pair of total weights (A, B) obtained by the
two agents.
Now an optimal strategy can be determined for both agents by
settling all decisions by backward induction. This means that for
each node, whose child nodes are all leaves, the associated agent
can reach a ﬁnal decision by simply choosing the best of all child
nodes w.r.t. their allocated total weight. Then these leaf nodes
can be deleted and the pair of gained weights of the chosen leaf
is moved to its parent node. In this way, we can move upwards
in the tree towards the root and settle all decisions along the way.
If an agent, say Pb, follows a certain strategy S, then Pb will exe-
cute a certain decision in each of its nodes. Thus, each of its nodes
only has one child node. Pa can determine an optimal answer
against strategy S by following the same procedure as above.
Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be easily used in practice
due to the exponential number of nodes in the game tree. In partic-
ular, it can be easily concluded from the proof of Proposition 1, that
it is NP-hard to compute the optimal strategy for an agent against
a given strategy of the other agent. To escape this intractability, it
is a reasonable approach to make use of heuristic algorithms as
strategies (see in Sections 2.2 and 3).
In the terminology of game theory an optimal strategy as de-
scribed above is by deﬁnition a Nash equilibrium and also a so-
called subgame perfect equilibrium (a slightly stronger property),
since the decisions made in the above backward induction proce-
dure are also optimal for every subtree (see Osborne (2004, Sec-
tion 5) for more details). Clearly, the optimal strategy and hence
the equilibrium of the game is not unique, since there may well
be several different leafs of the game tree yielding the same
weights for both agents.
2.2. Heuristic algorithms
Because it is NP-hard to compute an optimal strategy, we will
consider heuristic strategies for the agents. A simple greedy algo-
rithm is a very natural choice for the Subset Sum game. In this case
an agent simply selects in every round the itemwith largest weight
that does not violate the capacity constraint. In this way, the capac-
ity available for the other agent is (at least locally) minimized,
which seems to be an intuitively appealing approach. In Section 3.1
it is shown that such a greedy algorithm may reach only half of the
weight obtained by an optimal strategy but cannot do worse than
that. For sake of completeness we also give a formal description in
Algorithm 1.Algorithm 1. GREEDY G
N :¼ Na; c :¼ c;
while minfajjj 2 Ng 6 c do
amax :¼ maxfajjaj 6 c; j 2 Ng attained for ~|;
select item ~|;N :¼ N  f~|g;
selection of an item b0 by Pb;
c :¼ c  a~|  b0
end while
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is the following LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY algorithm L, which tries to avoid
the shortsightedness of GREEDY at least to some extent. Motivated by
the worst-case example given in Section 3.1 (proof of Theorem 5) it
considers in every round all feasible pairs of items and picks the
pair with highest total weight. The larger item of this pair is then
selected in the current round. In this context a pair of items is
feasible if Pa can be sure to be able to select the two items in the
current and the subsequent round, no matter what Pb does in the
current round, i.e. even if Pb selects the largest item that ﬁts. A for-
mal description is given in Algorithm 2. To avoid tedious special
cases we assume that there are always sufﬁcient items available
for Pa to consider a pair of items in every round. This can be
achieved by adding dummy items with weight 0.
542 A. Darmann et al. / European Journal ofAlgorithm 2. LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY L
N :¼ Na; c :¼ c;
while minfajjj 2 Ng 6 c do
pmax:¼0;
for every pair (i, j) in N with aiP aj do
bmax :¼maxfb‘jb‘ 6 c  aig
if ai þ bmax þ aj 6 c then
pmax:¼max{pmax, ai + aj}
end if
end for
let pmax be attained for ð~ı;~|Þ;
select item ~ı;N :¼ N  f~ıg;
selection of an item b0 by Pb;
c :¼ c  a~ı  b0
end while
It should be noted that algorithm LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY may also se-
lect an item different from ~| in the next round if a different pair of
items without ~| turns out to be the best choice in the next round or
if Pb does not select the maximal possible weight bmax in the cur-
rent round.
A natural generalization of LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY looks even farther
into the future and considers more than two items as a look
ahead. The resulting k-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY algorithm (k-L) deter-
mines, in each round, the best combination of k items for Pa that
cannot be ‘‘blocked’’ by the opponent Pb. Then the largest item of
this k-tuple is selected in this round. Clearly, the above algorithm
L arises as the special case of 2-L. Note that by deﬁnition of this
algorithm, any possibility by Pb to block the k-tuple considered
by Pa is taken into account. This ‘‘blocking strategy’’ of Pb may
be quite different from the greedy strategy which always puts
bmax against 2-L.
While it is easy to see that LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY may perform better
than GREEDY (see e.g. Example 3), and also 3-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY may
perform better than 2-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY (e.g. in Example 5), we
can show that it may also be the other way round (see e.g. Example
1). In conclusion, there is no strict dominance between the differ-
ent extensions of the GREEDY strategy.
Example 1. Consider the following instance of the Subset Sum
game with capacity 12 + 5d where d e.Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Na 10 4  e 4  e 4  e 12 12 12 12
Nb d d d d dObserve that the items in Nb can all be packed and can be
neglected in the selection of Pa. 3-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY identiﬁes the
three items with weight 4  e as the best triple and selects one
of them. In round 2, only the remaining two items of this triple
can be packed, and the algorithm continues to gain a total weight
of 12  3e.
An optimal selection of Pa would start with item 1 and
continues to pack all four items of weight 12 ending up with a total
weight of 12. Note that GREEDY and 2-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY both pick
this optimal strategy.
A simple variation of this example where the three items of
weight 4  e are replaced by two items of weight 6  e shows by an
analogous reasoning that 2-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY may be stuck with
12  2e while the optimal solution identiﬁed by GREEDY obtains 12.3. Performance analysis
To analyze the performance of the heuristics for the Subset Sum
game we follow a worst-case perspective taking agent Pa’s point of
view. As in the performance analysis of classical approximation
algorithms, we consider the worst solution scenario over all possi-
ble instances, i.e. sets of input data, and compare the solution value
derived by a heuristic with the solution value attained by the opti-
mal strategy.
Differently from classical optimization problems we also have
to include the strategy of agent Pb in our analysis. In the following
we deﬁne as performance bound qHS 2 [0,1] a bound on the ratio
between the solution value of a heuristic H and the solution value
of an optimal strategy, denoted by O, for agent Pa both playing
against a speciﬁed strategy S of the adversary agent Pb, i.e.
qHS 6
AHS
AOS
for all inputs: ð1Þ
As usual, we call a performance bound qHS tight, if no larger value
than qHS exists which fulﬁlls (1).
Assuming that Pb does not act in a completely arbitrary or self
destructive way, the most plausible strategy S of Pb is the optimal
response. That is, knowing the strategy H of Pa, Pb maximizes its
total weight (cf. Section 2.1) neither trying to help nor harm Pa.
By maximizing its own total weight, the capacity remaining to
be utilized by Pa is automatically minimized, which ﬁts well to-
gether with the notion of a worst-case analysis. However, note
that an optimal strategy of Pb does not necessarily yield the worst
possible outcome for a strategy of Pa. This can be seen—after
exchanging the roles of Pa and Pb—from Example 4, where the
switching from the optimal to the GREEDY strategy of one agent
generates a worse outcome for the optimal strategy of the other
agent.
To avoid clumsy notation we assume w.l.o.g. that the items of
both agents are numbered in the order they are selected during
the game, i.e. agent Pa selects aj in round j. Items not selected are
numbered arbitrarily with indices higher than the selected items.
The following proposition will be useful in the proofs below.
Proposition 2. It can always be assumed that an optimal strategy of
Pb selects items in nonincreasing order of weights against the GREEDY
strategy of Pa.Proof. Assume contrary to the statement that there exists a
selected item bj such that bj1 < bj, jP 2. Clearly, there must be
Xj
k¼1
bk 6 c 
Xj
k¼1
ak () aj 6 c 
Xj1
k¼1
ak 
Xj
k¼1
bk: ð2Þ
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with capacity at most c Pj1k¼1ak Pj1k¼1bk, and since aj also fulﬁlls
the stricter condition (2), it follows that aj is also the maximum over
all remaining items with the intermediate capacity at most
c Pj1k¼1ak Pj2k¼1bk  bj. Therefore, the GREEDY algorithm of Pa does
not change its selection in round j even if Pb selects bj in round j  1
and bj1 in round j. h
Note that Proposition 2 does not hold for the LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY
strategy, as shown in the following example:
Example 2. Consider the following instance I of the Subset Sum
game with capacity c = 19 + 3e.Ta
ReItemble 1
sulting games in in
Round 1 of Pb
c
Best pair of Pa
Round 2 of Pa
c
Round 2 of Pb
c
Round 3 of Pa
Round 3 of Pb
ALO
BLO1stance I , after Pa ch
5 + 4e 5
8  e 8 +
6, 0 3 +
6 3 +
2  e 5 +
3e 2
2  4e 3 +
– 3 +
– –
12 12
5 + 7e 72ose item 1 in t
3e
e, 3 + e
e
2e
2e
e
+ 2e3he ﬁrst round.
2 3e
11 + 3e 13
6, 0 3 + e
6 3 + e
5 + 3e 10 
5 5 + 4
3e 5 
0 3 + e
3e –
12 12 +
7 + 3e 5 + 74Na 6 6 3 + e 3 + e
Nb 5 + 4e 5 2 3eIn the ﬁrst round Pa computes the largest pair consisting of
items 1 and 2 and thus chooses item 1 with weight 6 leaving the
residual capacity c ¼ 13þ 3e. Pb has four possibilities to react.
The resulting games are listed as columns in Table 1.
In order to achieve the maximum total weight for herself, Pb has
to choose ﬁrst the item with weight 2 and then the one with
weight 5. In some sense Pb can ‘‘threaten’’ to use its largest item 1
in the next round and thereby forces Pa to choose the larger item
with weight 6 instead of items 3 and 4. Thereby LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY
leaves room for the ﬁnal item 3e of Pb. If Pb chose items in
decreasing order of their weights, this would permit a better choice
for Pa and would reduce the total weight attained by Pb.
By going through all possible solutions it can be checked that in
the above example the strategy of Pa is optimal.
We summarize the results of Example 2 in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. The optimal strategy of agent Pb against LOOK-AHEAD
GREEDY or against an optimal strategy of agent Pa may select items in a
non-monotone order of weights. h3.1. Performance of the GREEDY Algorithm
The following technical lemma will be used to prove the
performance bound of GREEDY both against an optimal and against
a greedy strategy of Pb.
Lemma 4. Let agent Pa use the GREEDY strategy G and let S be the
strategy used by Pb. Assume that GREEDY is able to select the largest
j  1 items of Na and fails to pack the jth largest item in round j against
S. If S 2 {O, G} then, 3 + e
e
e
5e
2e
eAOS 6 c 
Xj1
k¼1
bk;
where b1, . . . ,bj1 are the items selected by Pb in the ﬁrst j  1 rounds
following strategy S against the GREEDY strategy G of Pa.Proof. We assume jP 2, since the statement is trivial for j = 1.
Since AOS 6 c  BOS, it is sufﬁcient to show that for S 2 {O, G} we
have BOS P
Pj1
k¼1bk.
Let S = O, i.e., Pb uses its optimal strategy. Then, even an optimal
strategy of Pa cannot avoid that Pb reaches a total weight BOO of at
least
Pj1
k¼1bk, which Pb managed to achieve after j  1 rounds even
against the largest j  1 items of Na.
Let S = G. Assume that BOG <
Pj1
k¼1bk. Let
~b1; ~b2; . . . ; ~bj1 be the
items selected in the ﬁrst j  1 rounds by G of Pb against O of Pa.
Then, in order to satisfy BOG <
Pj1
k¼1bk,
Xj1
k¼1
~bk <
Xj1
k¼1
bk ð3Þ
must hold. Since Pb uses the GREEDY strategy in both scenarios
(against G and against O of Pa), there is a unique smallest index i,
1 6 i 6 j  1, such that ~bi – bi. Note that because of i 6 j  1,
c Pik¼1~ak P c Pik¼1ak holds, where ~a1; . . . ; ~ai and a1, . . . ,ai denote
the items selected by Pa according to O and G, respectively. If ~bi < bi,
then in round i it would have been possible for Pb to pack the larger
item bi against O of Pa, which contradicts the fact that Pb uses the
greedy strategy. Hence, ~bi > bi holds. However, because of (3) and
the deﬁnition of i,
Pj1
k¼i bk >
Pj1
k¼i
~bk holds. This implies
Pj1
k¼ibk >
~bi,
and hence, when playing against G of Pa, Pb could have packed
~bi > bi in round i. Again, this contradicts the GREEDY strategy. There-
with, BOG P
Pj1
k¼1bk holds. hTheorem 5. The GREEDY algorithm G has a tight performance bound of
qGO ¼
1
2
:Proof. To show that AGO P 12AOO we assume AOO > AGO because
otherwise AOO = AGO and we are done. By the greedy strategy G
selects the largest j  1 items of Na and fails to pack the jth largest
item with weight ~a in round j for some jP 2. It may continue to
pack smaller items, but these can be neglected in our analysis. IfPj1
k¼1ak P
1
2 AOO we are done. Otherwise, for
Pj1
k¼1ak <
1
2 AOO we
apply a simple averaging argument to show
~a 6 aj1 6
1
j 1
Xj1
k¼1
ak <
1
j 1
1
2
AOO 6
1
2
AOO: ð4Þ
Since ~a could not be selected in round j there must be
~a > c 
Xj1
k¼1
ak 
Xj1
k¼1
bk ()
Xj1
k¼1
ak > c 
Xj1
k¼1
bk  ~a: ð5Þ
Because of Lemma 4, AOO 6 c 
Pj1
k¼1bk holds. Putting this inequality
together with (5) and plugging in (4) we get
AOO  AGO 6 c 
Xj1
k¼1
bk  c 
Xj1
k¼1
bk  ~a
 !
¼ ~a 6 1
2
AOO
and we have shown qGO 6 12.
The following Example 3 gives an instance with parameter
e > 0 where lime!0qGO ¼ 12 thus completing the proof of the
theorem. h
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1
2 e 12 eNb 2e eIn the ﬁrst round Pa selects the largest item 1 and Pb chooses 2e.
Now Pa cannot select another item and AGO ¼ 12. An optimal strategy
would select items 2 and 3 with a total weight of AOO = 1  2e.Corollary 6. Against the GREEDY strategy G of Pb, the GREEDY strategy of
Pa has a tight performance ratio of
qGG ¼
1
2
:Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Theorem 5 when AOO
(AGO) are replaced by AOG (AGG). The tightness of the bound again
can be concluded from the instance used in Example 3. h
It could be expected that the optimal strategy for Pb always
yields a better solution against a suboptimal strategy of Pa, such
as G, than against an optimal strategy of Pa. Clearly, if Pa consumes
less capacity, there is more capacity left for Pb to utilize. Surpris-
ingly, this is not always the case as shown by the following coun-
terexample. It may be necessary for Pb to select a less attractive
item in order to block another item of Pa. However, if both agents
pursue an optimal strategy, they might both beneﬁt.
Example 4. Consider an instance with the following data and
capacity c = 23.Item 1 2 3 4 5Na 7 7 4 4 4
Nb 10 5.5 5.5 0 0If Pa follows the GREEDY algorithm G, it ﬁrst selects a1 = 7. If Pb selects
an item with weight 5.5 in the ﬁrst round, Pa could select the second
item of weight 7 in the second round thus preventing Pb from pick-
ing a further item. Hence, Pb has to choose item 1 in the ﬁrst round
ending the game with BGO = 10, while Pa can add an item of weight 4
in the second round obtaining AGO = 11.
To ﬁnd an optimal strategy we depict a partial decision tree
below. Numbers in the circles refer to item weights while the
leaves of the tree contain the weights obtained by both agents.
Clearly, Pa will start with an item of weight 4 because otherwise
the above case applies again. If Pb chooses item 1 with weight 10 in
the ﬁrst round, Pa could select any item in the second round toprevent Pb from selecting any further items. Hence, Pb should
select, in the ﬁrst round, an item with weight 5.5. This allows Pa
two choices: (1) it selects an item of weight 7, then Pb would
continue with the other item of weight 5.5 and both agents are
ﬁnished gaining a total weight of 11 each; (2) Pa selects another
item of weight 4, then again Pb continues with the other item of
weight 5.5 (since item 1 does not ﬁt) and reaches a total weight of
BOO = 11 while Pa can enter into a next round to submit a third item
of weight 4 yielding AOO = 12 (circled outcome).
Thus, we have given an instance with AGO < AOO and BGO < BOO.
While the optimal strategy of an agent may even suffer from a
suboptimal strategy of its opponent, the following proposition says
that for the GREEDY strategy it is always better if the opponent devi-
ates from an optimal response to a greedy response.
Proposition 7. GREEDY for Pa always beneﬁts if Pb applies GREEDY rather
than an optimal strategy, that is
AGG P AGO:Proof. We can assume AGG– AGO because otherwise we are done.
Let ak (resp. ~ak) denote the item selected by G of agent Pa against
G (resp. O) of Pb in round k, kP 1. Note that a1 ¼ ~a1 holds since
Pa applies the greedy strategy in both scenarios. Thus, there must
be an index iP 2 such that ai – ~ai and aj ¼ ~aj holds for j < i.
Case 1: ~ai > ai. Then, in round i agent Pa was able to pack the
larger item ~ai against O of Pb but could not pack it against G
of Pb. Hence, BGG > c 
Pi1
k¼1ak þ ~ai. On the other hand, since in
the ﬁrst i rounds Pa was able to pack the items ~ak, 1 6 k 6 i,
against O of Pb, we must haveBGO 6 c 
Xi
k¼1
~ak ¼ c 
Xi1
k¼1
ak þ ~ai:I.e., BGG > BGO holds, in contradiction to the deﬁnition of O.
Case 2: ~ai < ai. This means that in round i, agent Pa was able to
pack the larger item ai against G of Pb but could not pack it
against O of Pb. Thus, BGO > c 
Pi1
k¼1~ak þ ai, which settles the
claim because it impliesAGO <
Xi1
k¼1
~ak þ ai ¼
Xi
k¼1
ak 6 AGG: 3.2. Performance of the LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY Algorithm
Westartwitha simplepropositioncomplementingProposition2.
Proposition 8. It can always be assumed that the LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY
strategy of agent Pa selects items in nonincreasing order of weights
against the optimal strategy of agent Pb.Proof. Assume that for some round j there is aj < aj+1. Since in
round j the LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY computes a pair of items and selects
the larger of the pair, this means that a different pair (j, k) was
determined yielding pmax. By deﬁnition of the algorithm ajP ak
holds and hence ak < aj+1. Hence, items j and j + 1 would have been
a better pair than j and k and must have been excluded from the
computation of pmax, which means that aj þ bmax þ ajþ1 > c.
By deﬁnition of bmax in LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY, the item with weight
bmax would be a feasible selection for Pb after aj. But then
bmax > c  aj  ajþ1 P c  ALO P BLO ð6Þ
yields a contradiction to the optimality of the strategy of Pb. h
Note that Proposition 8 does not hold for every adversary
strategy S. Pb may surprisingly select an extremely small item
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from the original strategy to select a certain pair of items, each
one with smaller weight.
Theorem 9. The LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY algorithm L has a tight perfor-
mance bound of
qLO ¼
2
3
:
Proof. Let Opt:¼AOO and assume AOO > ALO (otherwise AOO = ALO and
we are done). Denote the items selected by an optimal strategy O of
Pa as aj. By Proposition 8, a1 and a2 are the largest two items
selected by L. If a1 þ a2 P 23 Opt we are done. Assuming
a1 þ a2 < 23 Opt it follows again from Proposition 8 that aj < 13 Opt
for all jP 2.
First, we consider the special case a1 > a1: It follows from the
decision of L in the ﬁrst round that a1 and a2 cannot be considered
in the selection of the best pair, because this pair would be better
than a1 and a2, but a1, as the larger of the pair, was not selected in
round 1. Thus, there must exist some item ~b, which Pb could select
in round 1, to block this pair, i.e. a1 þ ~b 6 c and a1 þ a2 þ ~b > c.
Clearly, this means that AOO 6 c  ~b. Hence, we have
AOO  ALO 6 c  ~b ða1 þ a2Þ < a1  a1:
Now we note that a1 < 23 Opt because otherwise a1 would be a suf-
ﬁciently large solution for L as a single item.
If a1 P 13 Opt, then we have from above
AOO  ALO < a1  a1 < 23 Opt 
1
3
Opt ¼ 1
3
Opt
and are done.
If a1 < 13 Opt, we can use the previous inequalities to show
a1 þ a1 P a1 þ a2 > c  ~bP AOO ¼ Opt:
Since a1 < 23 Opt this implies a1 >
1
3 Opt in contradiction to the
assumption of this subcase.
Generalizations of these arguments will be used in the follow-
ing to show the statement for the general case of a1 6 a1.
At ﬁrst we introduce two technical lemmata. Lemma 10
corresponds to the situation of Pa trying to select a pair ~a and
aj0þ1 in round j
0 + 1 and realizing that ~a could well be packed on its
own, but Pb has an item ~b available to block aj0þ1. hLemma 10. Assume that after completion of some round j0, j0 < na of
Pa playing L against O of Pb, there exist items ~a (resp. ~b) not yet
selected by L (resp. Pb), such that the following inequalities hold:Xj0
k¼1
ak þ ~aþ
Xj0
k¼1
bk þ ~b 6 c; ð7Þ
Xj0
k¼1
ak þ ~aþ aj0þ1 þ
Xj0
k¼1
bk þ ~b > c: ð8Þ
If BOO P
Pj0
k¼1bk þ ~b then we have
AOO  ALO < ~a:Proof. Clearly, we can bound the weight obtained by L as
ALO P
Pj0þ1
k¼1ak. Then we get from the condition of the Lemma and
by applying (8)
AOO  ALO 6 ðc  BOOÞ 
Xj0þ1
k¼1
ak
< c 
Xj0
k¼1
bk  ~b c 
Xj0
k¼1
bk  ~b ~a
 !
¼ ~a: Lemma 11 states that as long as L dominates the optimal strat-
egy of Pa in every round, the total weight collected by Pb against an
optimal strategy of Pa is at least as large as the weight Pb would
gain against an adversary Pa pursuing strategy L.Lemma 11. If there exists an index j0 P 1 such thatX‘
k¼1
ak P
X‘
k¼1
ak for all ‘ ¼ 1; . . . ; j0; ð9Þ
then BOO P
Pj0
k¼1bk.Proof. If BOO <
Pj0
k¼1bk, then the strategy of Pb cannot be optimal
since Pb could have chosen the items b1; . . . ; bj0 instead. By the con-
dition of the lemma these items would have been a feasible choice
in every round ‘ 6 j0. h
Proceeding with the proof of Theorem 9 we now let j be the ﬁrst
round where the optimal strategy reaches a higher total weight
than L, i.e. j is the minimal index such that
Xj1
k¼1
ak P
Xj1
k¼1
ak and
Xj
k¼1
ak <
Xj
k¼1
ak: ð10Þ
Note that jP 2 holds in the considered case of a1 6 a1.
Now we consider the item set D consisting of items selected
in the ﬁrst j rounds by O, but not by L, i.e. D :¼
fa1; . . . ; ajg n fa1; . . . ; ajg. Obviously, D– ;. Let a1D (resp. a2D) denote
the largest (resp. second largest, if it exists) item in D. Note that
a2D will only be used in the proof if jDjP 2.
Case 1: a1D 6 13Opt. Trivially, a1D > aj because of (10). Recall from
Proposition 8 that aj is the smallest item selected by L in the
ﬁrst j rounds. Considering the decision of L in round j  1 we
distinguish two cases:
Case 1.1: a1D > aj1. In this case, L was able to select a pair con-
sisting of aj1 and some other item with smaller
weight, possibly aj but maybe some other item, in
round j  1. However, the better pair a1D and aj1
was not selected because otherwise a1D would have
been selected by L in round j  1 as the larger item
of the pair. This omission of a1D by L must be caused
by one of the following two cases:
(a) a1D could not be added in round j  1 at all. But this
means thatXj2
k¼1
ak þ a1D þ
Xj2
k¼1
bk > c: ð11ÞSince j was deﬁned as the smallest index fulﬁlling
(10), we can apply Lemma 11 for j0 = j  2 (also
j0 = j  1 would be feasible, but is not required here)
and get BOO P
Pj2
k¼1bk. Replicating the proof of Lem-
ma 10 and plugging in (11) it follows thatAOO  ALO 6 c  BOO 
Xj2
k¼1
ak
< c 
Xj2
k¼1
bk  c 
Xj2
k¼1
bk  a1D
 !
¼ a1D
6 1
3
Opt ð12Þand we are done.
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the deﬁnition of L) Pb has some ‘‘blocking’’ item ~b
available preventing Pa from selecting a1D in round
j  1 and aj1 in round j. Choosing j0 = j  2 and
~a ¼ a1D this blocking scenario is exactly described by
(7) and (8).
Condition (9) of Lemma 11 clearly holds for
‘ = 1, . . . , j  2, but can be extended for ‘ = j  1 as fol-
lows: With (10) we can state thatXj2
k¼1
ak þ a1D >
Xj1
k¼1
ak P
Xj1
k¼1
ak:For our case, (7) says that even if in round j  1 agent
Pa selected an item a1D larger than aj1, agent Pb could
still add ~b to its current selection of
Pj2
k¼1bk. Replicat-
ing the proof of Lemma 11 this yields
BOO P
Pj2
k¼1bk þ ~b. Therefore, the condition of Lemma
10 is fulﬁlled and we are done since
AOO  ALO < a1D 6 13Opt.
Case 1.2: a1D 6 aj1. In this case we notice that among the items
selected by L, but not by O, aj is the only item smaller
than a1D (the largest item in D). Hence, the difference
between the weights of L and O after round j can be at
most a1D  aj, since all other items in D only diminish
this difference. Formally,Xj
k¼1
ak 
Xj
k¼1
ak 6 a1D  aj: ð13ÞAs inCase1.1, there are twopossible scenarioswhy Ldid
not choose a1D in round j but settled for the smaller item
aj:
(a) If a1D could not be added in round j at all, then we can
repeat the arguments of Case 1.1 (a). Exchanging
j  2 by j  1 we apply (11) and (12) verbatim and
are done.
(b) If a1D could be added in round j, we recall Case 1.1 (b)
and note that Pb has again some ‘‘blocking’’ item ~b
available to prevent the pair a1D and aj, i.e. fulﬁlling
(7) and (8) for j0 = j  1 and ~a ¼ a1D.
Now, (10) guarantees the condition required in
Lemma 11 only for ‘ = 1, . . . , j  1. With (13) it can
be extended for ‘ = j since
Pj
k¼1ak 6
Pj1
k¼1ak þ a1D.
Now (7) says that even if in round j agent Pa selected
an item a1D larger than aj, agent Pb could still add
~b to
its current selection of
Pj1
k¼1bk. Again replicating the
proof of Lemma 11 yields BOO P
Pj1
k¼1bk þ ~b. Now
the condition of Lemma 10 is fulﬁlled and AOO  ALO
< a1D 6 13Opt settles this case.
Case 2: a1D >
1
3Opt. If a2 P
1
3Opt then a1 þ a2 P 23Opt and we are
done. Hence, in the following we can assume a2 < 13Opt < a
1
D.
Furthermore, we ﬁrst consider the special case that a1 was also
selected by O, i.e. O contains both a1 and a1D. In that case, this
pair is also a feasible pair for L to consider in the ﬁrst round.
If Pb were able to block this pair, it could increase its weight
by doing so and thus O could not select both against an optimal
strategy of Pb. If a1 P a1D, then a1 þ a1D P 23Opt and we are done.
If a1 < a1D then a
1
D and a1 are a better pair than the pair selected
by L in the ﬁrst round consisting of a1 and some smaller item a0.
L selected a1 as the larger of the smaller pair (a1, a0), but by def-
inition L should have selected a1D as the larger item of the better
pair a1D; a1
 
in the ﬁrst round. Hence, we can assume in the fol-
lowing that a1 was not selected by O.Case 2.1: jDj = 1. In order to satisfy (10) wemust have a1 < a1D in
this case, since items a2, . . . ,aj are selected both by L
and by O. Therefore, a1D and a2 are both contained in
O and they are a better feasible pair than a1 and a2.
Since Pb could not prevent this pair (otherwise it
would be have been advantageous for Pb to do so), L
should have selected a1D in the ﬁrst round as the larger
item of the feasible pair a1D; a2
 
instead of a1. Thus, we
have found a contradiction to the deﬁnition of L.
Case 2.2: jDjP 2. We can assume a2D < 13Opt, because other-
wise L could have selected a1D and a
2
D in the ﬁrst round
and reach at least 23Opt. Depending on the size of a1
we distinguish two subcases:
(a) a1 < a1D. Then a
1
D and a2 would be a better pair than a1
and a2, but they are not selected by L in the ﬁrst
round. This is due to the fact that Pb is able to block
this pair with some item ~b with a1D þ a2 þ ~b > c and
a1D þ ~b 6 c. The latter means that ~b ﬁts also against
the largest item of O. Hence, combining the two con-
ditions yields AOO 6 c  ~b < a1D þ a2. Since a1D < 23Opt,
this implies a2 > 13Opt and thus a1 þ a2 > 23Opt and
we are done.
(b) a1 P a1D. Let a
⁄ be the largest item from a2, . . . ,aj not
contained in O with a < a2D, i.e. a
 ¼max
akjak < a2D; k ¼ 2; . . . ; j
 
. Such an a⁄ must exist,
because otherwise all items a2, . . . ,aj would be
greater or equal a2D and a1 P a
1
D which makes fulﬁll-
ment of (10) impossible.
If a⁄ was selected by L in some round j0 < j, we can
simply repeat without changes the arguments of Case
1.1 for j0 instead of j  1 and with a2D replacing a1D.
Recalling that a2D <
1
3Opt we reach the desired result.
If a⁄ was selected by L in round j, i.e. a⁄ = aj, we have
(recall Proposition 8) a2 P . . .P aj1 P a2D > a
. Since
also a1 P a1D, the difference between the weights of L
and O up to round j can be at most a2D  a, in analogy
to (13). Now we study the treatment of a2D.
(b1) a2D could not be added by L in round j (cf. Case
1.1(a)). This means thatXj1
k¼1
ak þ a2D þ
Xj1
k¼1
bk > c:Because of (10), Lemma 11 can be applied with j0 = j  1
yielding BOO P
Pj1
k¼1bk. Replicating again the proof of
Lemma 10 in analogy to (12) we get with the aboveAOO  ALO 6 c  BOO 
Xj1
k¼1
ak
< c 
Xj1
k¼1
bk  c 
Xj1
k¼1
bk  a2D
 !
¼ a2D
6 1
3
Opt: ð14Þ(b2) a2D could be added by L in round j (cf. Case 1.1(b)).
Since L selected aj in round j together with some other,
smaller item, we know that the better pair ða2D; ajÞ was
not chosen in round j, although a2D would ﬁt on its own.
Thus, theremustbeagainsomeblocking item ~bavailable
for Pb fulﬁlling (7) and (8) for j0 = j  1 with ~a ¼ a2D.
As before, condition (9) of Lemma 11 holds for
‘ = 1, . . . , j 1 and can be extended for ‘ = j: Recall from
above the bound on the difference between the weight
of L and O with a⁄ = aj,
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k¼1
ak 
Xj
k¼1
ak 6 a2D  aj )
Xj1
k¼1
ak þ a2D P
Xj
k¼1
ak:Replicating again the proof of Lemma 11 and considering (7)
it follows that BOO P
Pj1
k¼1bk þ ~b. Therefore, Lemma 10 can be
applied and we are done sinceAOO  ALO < a2D 6
1
3
Opt:All together we have shown qLO 6 23.
The following Example 5 is a straightforward extension of
Example 3. It gives an instance with parameter e > 0 where
lime!0qLO ¼ 23 thus completing the proof of the theorem.
Example 5. Consider an instance of our problem in which the
capacity is c = 1 and the items weights are as follows.Item 1 2 3 4 5Na 13
1
31
3 e 13 e 13 eNb 2e e eIn the ﬁrst two rounds Pa by the LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY strategy selects
items 1 and 2 with total weight ALO ¼ 23 while Pb gains 3e. After
the second round Pa cannot select another item.
An optimal strategy would select items 3, 4 and 5 with a total
weight of AOO = 1  3e. h3.3. Performance of the k-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY Algorithm
It is natural to expect that the performance of the LOOK-AHEAD
GREEDY heuristic should improve the more items one includes in
the look ahead set, i.e. qkLO increases in k. When moving from
k = 1 to k = 2 this was shown to be true in the previous sections.
The general case could be seen as being related to the construction
of a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the Subset
Sum and the Knapsack problem, where subsets of a certain cardi-
nality ‘ are enumerated and the larger ‘, the smaller the resulting
relative error e.
Surprisingly, the following example shows that this is not the
case. Instead, it can be shown that the worst case performance
bound of 23 given in Theorem 9 is also an upper bound for the k-
LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY algorithm for arbitrary kP 3.
Theorem 12. The performance of the k-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY algorithm
k  L for kP 3 is bounded by
qkLO 6
2
3
:Proof. The theorem can be proven by considering an instance with
capacity c = 12, d e, k 2 {3, . . . ,na} and the following items
weights.Item 1 2 3 4 5 6    na
Na 2 + e 2 + e 2  e 2  e 2  e d    d
Nb 6 3 + e 3 + e 2þ 12 ePa is able to choose any pair of items from the set {1,2,3,4,5}
together with items of size d in the ﬁrst round, since they cannot
be blocked by Pb. However Pa is neither able to choose any set con-
taining items 1, 2, 3 (which would exceed the capacity) nor can Pa
choose items 3, 4 and 5, as Pb can block them with items 1 and 4.Hence the set of items considered by Pa in the ﬁrst round of any k-
LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY contains one item of weight 2 + e and two items
of weight 2  e. Thus, item 1 is selected in the ﬁrst round. A
residual capacity c ¼ 10 e remains for Pb who has three possibil-
ities to react. The resulting games are listed as columns in the fol-
lowing table:Round 1 of Pa 2 + e 2 + e 2 + e
Round 1 of Pb 6 3 + e 2þ 12 e
c 4  e 7  2e 38 2 e
Best tuple of Pa 2  e, 2  e 2 + e, d 2 + e, 2  e
Round 2 of Pa 2  e 2 + e 2 + e
c 2 5  3e 6 52 e
Round 2 of Pb 3 + e 3 + e 7c 2 2  4e 3 2 e
Round 3 of Pa 2  e d 2  e
Round 3 of PbAkLO 6  e
+ (na  3)d4 + 2e
+ (na  2)d6 + e
+ (na  3)dBkLO 6 6 + 2e 5þ 32 eIt turns out that the optimal strategy for Pb against the k-LOOK-
AHEAD GREEDY of Pa is given by selecting item 2 in the ﬁrst round
as represented in the second column of the table. Thus, we get
AkLO  4
The following table shows the optimal strategy of Pa against an
optimal strategy of Pb. Pa starts the game by selecting an item of
weight 2  e leaving a residual capacity c ¼ 10þ e for Pb. For Pb
three possibilities remain:Round 1 of Pa 2  e 2  e 2  e
Round 1 of Pb 6 3 + e 2þ 12 e
c 4 + e 7 18þ 2 e
Round 2 of Pa 2 + e 2  e 2 + e
c 2 5 + e 6 12 e
Round 2 of Pb 3 + e 3 + ec 2 2 33 2 e
Round 3 of Pa 2  e 2  e 2 + e
Round 3 of PbA 6  e 6  3e 6 + eOO
+ (na  3)d + (na  3)d + (na  3)dBOO 6 6 + 2e 5þ 32 eAgain, the optimal strategy for Pb is given by selecting item 2 in
the ﬁrst round as illustrated in the second column. We get AOO  6
which completes the proof. h4. The centralized perspective
As it is often done in game theoretic settings, we can put the out-
come of the game by two competing and selﬁsh agents in perspec-
tive to a centralized view, where a single decision maker makes all
selections for both item sets Na and Nb. The goal of such a centralized
decision is the maximization of the total weight obtained from both
item sets. Clearly, the centralized decision has to select items from
Na and Nb in turn as in the underlying Subset Sum game.
It is easy to see that the computation of such a globally optimal
solution weight W⁄ is an NP-hard problem since it contains the
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similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
In algorithmic game theory, the Prize of Anarchy is a widely
used concept to analyze the difference between a global optimum
and the outcome arising from the combined solutions of selﬁsh
agents. For the Subset Sum game, we compare the optimal weight
generated by the central decision to the outcome obtained by the
two agents each following its own optimal strategy (cf. Section 2.1).
A simple example shows that the Prize of Anarchy can be arbi-
trarily high.
Proposition 13. There exist instances where
W
AOO þ BOO !1:Example 6. Consider an instance with capacity c = 1 and the fol-
lowing sets of items.Item 1 2Na 2e e
Nb 1  e eA centralized optimal solution would select item 2 from Na and item
1 from Nb in the ﬁrst round and reachW⁄ = 1. An optimal strategy by
Pa would surely start with item 1 which leaves to Pb only the selec-
tion of item 2 and AOO + BOO = 3e.
The central decision maker could also consider the game as a
bicriteria optimization problem where the items from each agent’s
set constitute one objective. The decision problem whether a cer-
tain pair of weights (Wa, Wb) can be reached is again NP-complete
from SSP.
From an approximation point of view, it is not sufﬁcient to
apply a fully polynomial approximation scheme (FPTAS) for each
(SSP) associated to each agent since one has to take the rounds
with alternating selections from both item sets into account.
However, we can consider the cardinality constrained Subset Sum
problem (kSSP), where at most k items can be selected. Following
the dynamic programming approach in Caprara, Kellerer, Pfers-
chy, and Pisinger (2000) and assuming integer weights, we can
compute for each agent every reachable pair (‘, W) with
‘ = 1, . . . ,na, respectively nb, and W = 1, . . . ,c. Then we search for
the best combination of two solutions with equal cardinality
(=number of rounds) such that agent’s Pa weights reach at least
Wa and agent’s Pb weights reach at least Wb but their sum does
not exceed c.
Now we can transform this pseudopolynomial exact dynamic
programming solution procedure into an FPTAS by the usual scal-
ing techniques (cf. Caprara et al., 2000) and thus answer the
approximation version of the above question whether a solution
with weights (A, B) exists with (1  e)Wa 6 A 6Wa and (1  e)Wb -
6 B 6Wb in time polynomial in the size of the encoded input and
1/e.
5. Extension to the Knapsack Game
It appears natural to extend the addressed Subset Sum game to
a Knapsack Game by introducing proﬁts for all items. In this case,
the two agents would strive to maximize the total proﬁt of their se-
lected items while the weights still have to obey the capacity
restriction. In this section it is shown that extending the Greedy-
type algorithms introduced in Section 2.2 to the knapsack case
does not yield a bounded performance ratio.There are two natural approaches to extend the GREEDY or k-LOOK-
AHEAD GREEDY algorithms to a Knapsack Game: one may, in each step,
choose the most ‘‘efﬁcient’’ items (according to their proﬁt to
weight ratio), or one tries to gain as much proﬁt as possible by sim-
ply choosing the item with largest proﬁt in each round.
It can easily be shown that the k-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY (kP 2) –
which stepwise lays its focus on the best k-tuple according to the
sum of the proﬁt to weight ratios – has an arbitrarily bad perfor-
mance bound. The same example works also for k = 1 which corre-
sponds to the GREEDY algorithm.
Example 7. Consider the following instance of the problem with
c = 1.Item 1    k k + 1
Na proﬁt 2e    2e 1weight e    e 1  e
Nb proﬁt 1weight 1  keSorting by proﬁt to weight ratios, Pa would identify the items
1, . . . ,k as the best k-tuple and select one of them in the ﬁrst round.
This leaves Pb the chance to submit its only item. The residual
capacity of (k  1)e can be used by Pa to select all remaining items
2, . . . ,k. Hence, the game stops with a total proﬁt of 2ke for Pa
against any strategy of Pb. An optimal strategy of Pa would select
item k + 1 in ﬁrst round and item 1 in the second round gaining
a proﬁt of 1 + 2e while Pb cannot select any item.
The following example shows that also the k-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY
algorithm for kP 1, i.e. including the pure GREEDY algorithm, has
an arbitrarily bad performance bound when focusing on the k-tu-
ple with the highest total proﬁt in each round.
Example 8. Consider the following instance with n k and
c = 1 + e.Item 1    k k + 1    n
Na proﬁt kþ kþ1nk    kþ kþ1nk 1þ 1nk    1þ 1nkweight 1
k   1
k1
nk    1nkNb proﬁt 1
weight eSorting by proﬁts, similarly to Example 7, Pa may select item 1 in
the ﬁrst round while Pb selects its only item. In all k  1 remaining
rounds, Pa chooses a k-tuple with all remaining items from 2, . . . ,k
complemented by smaller items and thus selects a large item in
each round yielding a total proﬁt of k2 þ kðkþ1Þnk for any strategy S of
Pb. An optimal strategy of Pa would select items k + 1, . . . ,n and gain
a proﬁt of (n  k) + 1. For n tending to inﬁnity, the performance of
the proﬁt based on k-LOOK-AHEAD GREEDY becomes arbitrarily bad.6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a game theoretic variant of the
well known Subset Sum problem in which the agents take turns to
select their items to be included in a capacitated shared resource.
This round-robin dynamics has been considered in other game the-
oretic studies of classical combinatorial problems (Agnetis et al.,
2007; Auletta et al., 2009; Piliouras, Valla, & Vegh, 2012), however
a possible topic for further research is to consider, as in Marini
et al. (2013) and Nicosia et al. (2011), a different game theoretic
A. Darmann et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 233 (2014) 539–549 549variant of the Subset Sum problem where the round-robin mecha-
nism is replaced by a central decision mechanism (coordinator)
which picks only one of the two items selected by the two agents
in each round (cf. Section 1.2). Hence, a coordinator may decide to
enforce different rules, that incorporate some idea of fairness
(which is for instance very important in the context of telecommu-
nication networks).
Another possible direction for future research is to analyze the
existence and the properties of equilibria, which can be used by a
coordinator to enforce solutions from which the agents have no
incentive to deviate.
Finally, one could study the problem in which an agent has lim-
ited information on the other agent’s items.Acknowledgements
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